During the last decade, a surprisingly high percentage of U.S. companies has fulfilled or beaten analysts' earnings per share forecasts. One of the most frequently cited reasons for this growing tendency is a change in the nature of U.S. executive compensation structure. As stock options have become an increasingly important part of executive compensation, the preservation or enhancement of short term stock value around the earnings announcement has become a priority for managers. Besides earnings management, a widespread way to meet analyst expectations is to inject pessimism into their forecasts by providing analysts with negative clues, or so-called downward guidance. This paper is the first to investigate the relationship between the practice of analyst guidance and executive compensation packages.
Introduction
Over the last decade, companies have tried particularly hard to meet analyst expectations.
There has been a strong decrease in the tendency of managers to report earnings falling short of analyst estimates (Brown 2001a, Burgstahler and Eames 2001) . Reporting earnings that do not fall short of analyst expectations can be achieved by two principal mechanisms. First, through the manipulation of discretionary accruals, executives are able to manage earnings in order to meet or beat analyst expectations. The second method is the induction of pessimism in analyst forecasts by providing analysts with negative clues leading to downward revisions in the consensus estimates. As a result, firms can more easily meet or beat analyst expectations. The business press is replete with articles referring to this latest practice. In a December 1998 Fortune Magazine article entitled "The Guidance Game", E. Schonfeld writes:
"… a company is allowed to provide the analysts with clues, or so-called guidance, about what it thinks earnings will be. The guidance number usually shows up as the consensus estimate among analysts. If the company meets or just beats the consensus, both that company and the analyst win:
The stock goes up and everyone looks smart." Fuller and Jensen (2002) attribute the increasing tendency of managers engaging in analyst manipulation strategies to a shift in the nature of executive compensation structure. As stock options have become an increasingly important component of executive compensation, the preservation or enhancement of short term stock value around the earnings announcement has become a priority for managers. In the Business Week edition of May 24, 1998, M.
Vickers corroborates this explanation:

"Companies need to generate positive surprises to keep not only stockholders but also stock-option holders happy -and that group is growing…"
In this paper, we investigate whether the tendency of executives to manage analyst forecasts downward is related to the incentives provided by their compensation packages.
Although past research and financial media have claimed that executives' expectations management practices are due to the increasing dependence of their compensation on the evolution of short term stock prices, to date no direct empirical tests of this relationship have been performed, taking explicitly into account the degree and nature of management's compensation and ownership exposure to their firm's stock performance.
We conduct two distinct sets of investigations. First, we analyze those components of CEO compensation contracts together with stock and option ownership, that most influence the extent of analyst guidance, taking into account other firm-specific factors. We tackle this problem by considering the characteristic components of the CEO compensation package due to their differing risk and incentive profiles. We find that CEO compensation components strongly influence the propensity of managers to engage in expectations management strategies. Consistent with common wisdom, we report a strong positive relationship between the practice of analyst guidance and the value of the CEO's in-the-money exercisable options as well as one between the sensitivity of the option portfolios to stock price movements and analyst guidance. Moreover, we document a positive relationship between the percentage of shares held by CEOs and analyst guidance. Furthermore, there is a strong positive relationship between analyst guidance and the bonuses paid annually to CEOs suggesting that meeting or beating analyst expectations constitutes an important determinant of CEO performance assessment. Finally, we document a negative link between CEO base salary and analyst guidance.
Second, we examine the extent to which the stock market is able to discern any pessimistic bias in analyst consensus forecasts induced by expectations management strategies. We conduct an event study around the earnings announcement dates to measure the valuation effects induced by expectations management strategies and we investigate whether these valuation effects are related to the factors that explain the extent of analyst guidance.
Similar to previous research, we find that firms which meet or beat analyst consensus forecasts display strong positive cumulative abnormal returns during the period surrounding the announcement date. However, for these firms, the market is partially able to discern analyst guidance strategies: companies that are suspected of managing analyst expectations in order to report a positive earnings surprise display a lower abnormal return at the earnings announcement than those not suspected of guiding analysts downward. Further analysis shows that this lower abnormal return is significantly and positively related to the options held by the CEOs.
Our findings complement previous research in several ways. We are the first to demonstrate the crucial role of executive compensation in explaining analyst guidance.
Secondly, we complement Matsumoto's (2002) analysis in which she shows that specific firm characteristics explain managerial incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises, although without including executive compensation components. In addition we provide the evidence that managers actually profit from taking actions to avoid negative earnings surprises. We also complement the results of Aboody and Kaznik (2000) , who show that executives manipulate analyst expectations by rushing bad news reports in order to decrease the strike prices of their awarded options. While they consider only the impact of newly awarded options as incentives to manipulate analyst expectations we take into account explicitly the impact of all exercisable in-the-money options and share ownership. Finally, our investigation contributes to the earnings surprise literature by showing that the positive cumulative abnormal returns for firms that meet or beat analyst forecast are smaller if the firms are likely to achieve this through expectations management. This complements the results of Bartov et al. (2002) , who draw identical conclusions, by using a different method to measure expectations management.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature related to expectations management. In Section 3, we develop hypotheses concerning the cross-sectional relationship between expectations management and CEO compensation components as well as CEO stock and option ownership. Section 4 presents the sample and the empirical design. Results are provided in Section 5. The paper is concluded in Section 6.
Literature review
Three important conclusions for expectations management stand out from past research.
First, reported earnings impact stock prices. Bartov et al. (2002) show that stocks of firms which meet or beat analyst forecasts command a significantly higher return at the announcement date than those with unfavorable surprises. Furthermore, they show that the cost of managing analyst expectations downward before the announcement date, is more than compensated by the stock price reaction to positive earnings surprises at the announcement date. More specifically, the stock price response to earnings announcement is 1.5 times stronger than the response to analysts' downward revisions before the announcement date in their sample. Lopez and Rees (2000) show that the firms that beat or meet analyst estimates over multiple subsequent quarters experience positive cumulative abnormal returns at the announcement date. Skinner and Sloan (2001) document that firms reporting negative surprises suffer large asymmetric market reactions compared to those reporting positive surprises; this applies in particular to growth firms. Second, management is concerned about the evolution of short term stock prices for several reasons. As underlined by Richardson et al. (2001) , managers of companies that intend to issue new equity are preoccupied with the current price level of their company as it directly impacts the amount of capital raised in the issue. Since many equity issues occur in the period following the public earnings announcement, a sharp price increase at the earnings release is particularly important for the success of such issues. Richardson et al. (2001) show that forecast pessimism prior to an earnings announcement is more common for firms that are about to issue new equity.
The structure of management compensation packages is another reason why executives care about their firms' near term stock prices. Murphy (1999) documents a strong increase in option compensation for U.S. CEOs between 1991 and 1996 across all industrial sectors. He also reports a strong increase in the value of stocks held by S&P 500 CEOs over the nineties. Yermack (1997) investigates CEO timing ability with respect to corporate news announcements and finds that CEOs receive stock option awards in advance of good earnings news boosting stock prices. By the same token, earnings announcements before CEO stock option awards are less favorable on average. Yermack concludes that CEOs exert influence on the compensation committee and are therefore able to manage the timing of their awards. Aboody and Kaznik (2000) find that CEOs make opportunistic voluntary disclosure decisions that increase the value of their stock option compensation. In particular, they investigate the timing of voluntary disclosures around option awards to the CEOs of firms with fixed award schedules, and find that managers of such firms manage investor expectations downward prior to the award date, by delaying good news and rushing forward bad news. Richardson et al. (2001) show that analyst forecasts are more pessimistic for firms whose insiders are net sellers of the firm's stock in the period following earnings announcement.
Managers may as well be concerned that a negative earnings surprise will affect their performance evaluation. Puffer and Weintrop (1991) find an increased probability of CEO turnover when earnings fall short of analyst expectations. In the same vein, Matsumoto (2002) shows that managers of firms with high institutional ownership are more likely to take actions to avoid negative earnings surprises. She attributes her finding to the pressure for near-term performance characterizing institutional investors. Moreover, she finds that firms relying on implicit claims with stakeholders and companies in industries with high litigation risk are more likely to take actions to avoid negative earnings surprises.
Finally, prior research concludes that managers have the ability to manage analyst forecasts. This is achieved by using numerous mechanisms, including public disclosures and non-formal communications (Rao and Sivakumar 2000) or by pressure on analysts to adjust their forecasts away from their true beliefs. A crucial input to the analyst is timely access to new information about the covered companies and, most of the time, this information is obtained from the companies themselves. Consequently, analysts have to cooperate with firms to achieve less restricted access to company management (Boni and Womack 2002). Lim (2001) argues that analysts rationally issue biased forecasts in order to obtain valuable future information from management, which is one of their key sources of information. To the extent that the analyst's employer holds large positions or maintains an investment banking relationship with the company covered, the analyst is likely subject to additional pressures regarding his forecasts. Michaely and Womack (1999) and Lin and McNichols (1998) document a systematic bias in recommendations for companies underwritten by the analyst's institution.
Overall, past research shows that there is a strong relationship between the sign of the earnings surprise and the stock price reaction at the earnings announcement, that managers have strong incentives to avoid negative surprises, and that they have the possibility to manage analysts through various information channels or by exerting pressure on analysts to issue forecasts that are compatible with managements' own objectives.
Hypotheses
In this section, we provide a description of the components that constitute most executive compensation packages: base salary, annual bonus, long term incentive plans, restricted stock plans, and stock option plans. Then, we develop hypotheses about the relationship between expectations management and these compensation components as an integral part of the CEO's total firm-related financial exposure.
We define expectations management as the tendency of firm managements to avoid negative earnings surprises via lowering analyst expectations. Expectations management is measured by a variable comparing the analyst consensus forecast and the expected earnings forecast according to the model described in section 4.2.
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Base salary represents the fixed component in executive contracts. Salaries are typically based on general industry salary surveys, and supplemented by detailed analysis of selected industry peers. Gao and Shrieves (2002) show that high CEO base salary decreases the incentive to engage in earnings management strategies. Since the total compensation of managers with a high base salary component is less dependent on the evolution of short term stock price, we expect managers with large base salary components to be less likely to engage in expectations management strategies. This leads to our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1:
The relationship between the salaries paid to CEOs and expectations management is negative.
Bonus plans awarded to top executives are generally based on a single-year performance measure. Murphy (1999) reports that most companies use two or more performance measures to pay the annual bonus to top executives and almost all companies rely on some measure of accounting profits to assess performance. Previous research suggests that the difference between analysts' earnings forecasts and realized earnings serves as a measure for the board to assess management performance (Puffer and Weintrop 1991) and that analysts' earnings forecasts reflect the board of directors' expectations about future performance for their organizations (Imhoff and Lobo 1984, Fuller and Jensen 2002) . Therefore, executives receiving bonus plans have an interest to keep the directors' expectations moderate (via analyst forecasts) in order to set performance thresholds relatively low. Accordingly our second hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between expectations management and the amount paid to CEOs according to annual bonus plans is positive.
The structure of common long term incentive plans is similar to the structure of bonus plans, with the exception that long term incentive plans are typically based on rolling-averages of three or five-year cumulative performance. As a consequence, we expect the relationship between long term incentive plans and expectations management to be similar, but weaker than that between bonus plans and expectations management. This leads to our third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3:
The relationship between expectations management and the amount paid to CEOs according to long term incentive plans is positive.
CEO stock positions have a linear payoff with respect to the share price. As a result, we expect a positive relationship between the total value of stocks held by managers and analyst guidance. Restricted stocks are "restricted" because shares are forfeited under certain conditions typically related to employment retention. We also expect a positive relationship between restricted stocks awarded to managers and analyst guidance. However, this latter relation is expected to be weaker as our data contains the restricted stocks granted in the current fiscal year only, which may also not be at the CEO's free disposal yet. 4 Hence the fourth hypothesis states the following:
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between the stocks held by CEOs and expectations management.
Stock options provide a direct link between managerial rewards and share price appreciation. Awarded stock options are usually non-tradable, and are typically forfeited if the executive leaves the firm before vesting. Murphy (1999) documents that most options expire after ten years and are granted with strike prices equal to the "fair market value" on the date of the grant. Given the convexity of option value with respect to stock price, executives will have a strong incentive to guide analysts, particularly when the sensitivity of granted options value with respect to stock price is relatively high. This leads to the fifth hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5:
There is a positive relationship between expectations management and the options held by the CEO (and their sensitivity with respect to stock price).
Sample and methodology
In this section, we first describe our sample selection process. Then, we present the measurement of the variables used in this paper and report their summary statistics. Finally, we describe the methodology used to test our hypotheses.
Sample selection
We use data from four sources. The CEO compensation information is taken from 6 As a result, after having filtered the data as described above, only 174 observations remain for this year. Another reason to delete this year from our sample is the fact that it was the first year in which executive compensation information had to be published in the present form and we do not want to introduce any selfselection biases in case the characteristics of the firms (not) reporting are correlated with the firm characteristics used in the construction of our explanatory variables. The final sample contains 7'787 firm-year observations.
Measuring expectations management
In order to measure expectations management, we adapt Matsumoto's (2002) methodology to yearly data. She defines expectations management as the difference between the last analyst consensus earnings forecast and the expected earnings per share based on a model of prior earnings and stock price changes. More formally, for each firm i in industry j during year t, the yearly change in earnings is modeled as a function of prior yearly change in earnings and returns cumulated over the current year:
where:
= earnings per share for firm i in two-digit SIC code j in year t, less earnings per share for the same firm one year prior, as reported by I/B/E/S. The model is estimated for each industry using all firms in that year that belong to the same two-digit SIC code. In a year, there must be at least eight companies in a particular industry for the equation to be estimated. The parameter estimates from the prior industry-year are used to determine the expected change in earnings per share ( [ ] E EPS ' ):
This value is then added to the previous year's earnings to obtain an estimate of the expected analyst forecast ( [ ] E FEPS ) for the current year's earnings:
Finally, we compute the unexpected earnings forecast as the difference between the last consensus forecast released by analysts prior to the earnings announcement date ( FEPS ) and the expected analyst forecast computed from the model:
Similar to Matsumoto (2002) , we define a dichotomous variable DOWN=1 if 0 UEF indicating that analyst expectations have been managed downward, and DOWN=0 if 0 UEF t indicating that analyst expectations have not been managed downward.
In Table 1 , we report the average value of the coefficients obtained from the industrial regressions described in equation (1) as well as the average value of their associated tstatistics, together with regression R-squareds.
[Insert Table 1 here]
On average, changes in earnings per share are positively and significantly associated with cumulative excess returns. Earnings per share changes are also positively associated with past changes in earnings. However, the average significance level is weaker.
Measuring CEO compensation components and ownership variables
We obtain the dollar value of each CEO's annual base salary, the dollar value of the CEO's annual bonus, the amount paid out to the CEO according to the company's long term incentive plans (LTIP), and the value of restricted shares (RSG) awarded during the year directly from the Execucomp database. In addition, we include the total percentage of the firm's shares held by the CEO at the end of the fiscal year ( SHARE ) to assess the impact of the total share position (as opposed to the stock grants awarded in the present year only) on expectations management. In addition we use the value of in-the-money and exercisable options ( INMONEX ) held by the CEO to measure the impact of the entire relevant option position. This item is provided by Execucomp and includes all in-the-money exercisable options from prior years' grants.
Considering the convexity of the relationship between share and option price, we should ideally compute a sensitivity measure of the INMONEX options to price movements in order to assess the exact impact of share price changes on CEO option portfolios. However, Execucomp reports detailed characteristics (e.g. maturity, strike price) only for the options that have been granted during the current fiscal year. Therefore we compute a variable based on the average sensitivity of the latter options in the CEO's portfolio to price changes of the underlying company stock (OPTSENS) to use it as a proxy for the sensitivity of the INMONEX options. The sensitivity of options that have been granted to CEOs during the current fiscal year, is measured as in Core and Guay (2001) . We define the sensitivity of granted options awarded to CEOs as the change in the dollar value of the holder's option for a 1% change in the stock price. We estimate the sensitivity of stock option value to stock price as the partial derivative of the option value with respect to stock price ("delta"). The option deltas are based on the Black-Scholes (1973) formula, as modified by Merton (1973) to account for dividend payments. 8 The detailed methodology as well as the parameters used to compute the value of the options awarded annually to CEOs are presented in the appendix.
[Insert mean is $289'089 and, similar to long term incentive plans, less than 33% of CEOs receive 8 We are aware that the Black-Scholes approach has many limitations for executive stock options: executives are limited by institutional restrictions to hedge or arbitrage their option values in the secondary market, their options are subject to forfeiture if they leave the company, and they are not free to trade or sell their options. In addition, company executives are undiversified, with their financial as well as human capital invested disproportionately in their company. As a result, CEOs tend to exercise their options much earlier than outside investors would. However, as underlined by Core and Guay (2001) , the Black-Scholes model can be considered as an accurate method to produce an instrumental variable to capture cross-sectional variation in option plan deltas.
restricted stocks. Finally, the mean (median) percentage of shares held by CEOs equals 3.35%
(0.48%), with a range from 0% to 63.23%.
Measuring control variables
We include additional explanatory variables to control for earnings thresholds, information environment, growth prospects, and further firm-specifics that are potentially related to expectations management. Degeorge et al. (1999) A priori, the direction of these threshold variables' influence on the probability of expectations management is not unambiguous. On the one hand, meeting or beating analyst expectations leads to a significant stock price rise at the earnings announcement. Furthermore, Lopez and Rees (2000) , show that this appreciation is much lower for firms that report a loss.
Accordingly, the same argument could apply to firms (not) reaching positive earnings changes. Therefore, one can expect managers of firms that report a loss, that will not meet analyst expectations, or that report a fall in earnings per share to have less incentives to manage analysts. On the other hand, if managers already use earnings management to reach one or several of these behavioral thresholds, then the probability of executives making use of analyst management might decrease. Hence, the relationship between analyst guidance and LOSS might be positive and negative for INCEPS and MEET. Brown and Higgins (2002) find that guidance increases with the richness of the firm's information environment. They characterize information environment as the availability and effectiveness of communication between managers and analysts and document a positive relationship between a firm's analyst coverage and the probability of expectations management. They use the absolute value of the final forecast error as an alternative proxy for information environment and document a negative relationship between forecast error magnitude and expectations management. However, this finding is to a certain extent tautological, since forecast errors will be smaller almost by construction for firms that manage analyst expectations downward. Typically, firms that beat analyst forecasts do so by a very small amount, whereas firms whose earnings fall short of the consensus frequently do so by much larger numbers ("big baths"). We measure a firm's informational environment by using two related proxies. First, we include residual analyst coverage (RCOV) as proposed by Hong et al. (2000) . Residual analyst coverage is the residual from the regression of the logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following the firm on the logarithm of the market value of the company taken at the beginning of the fiscal year. We include the market-to-book ratio (MB) as a proxy for the growth prospects of the firm.
It is computed as the market capitalization of the company divided by its book value of assets, both taken at the beginning of the fiscal year. Prior research has found growth firms (high market-to-book ratio) to suffer large and asymmetric reactions to negative earnings surprises (Skinner and Sloan 1999) . Brown (2001b) shows that growth firms have a higher probability of managing analysts compared to value firms. He accounts for this by the increase in managerial compensation in stocks and options. Due to the asymmetric market reaction to bad news, growth firm managers' portfolios will suffer a higher loss following a negative earnings surprise than those of value firm managers. Thus, if this explanation is valid, by including stock-based compensation and a proxy for growth jointly as explanatory variables for expectations management, there should not be any difference between the propensity of growth and value firms to engage in expectations management strategies. However, if the motives for growth firm managements to avoid negative surprises are not exclusively due to the structure of their management compensation, the growth proxy should remain positive and significant in explaining earnings management. Matsumoto (2002) reports that firms with high growth prospects (measured by the analyst long term EPS growth consensus forecast for the firm) are more likely to take actions to avoid negative surprises. 10 Alternatively, firms in distress (with very low market-to-book) might depend particularly on short-term earnings surprises in order to obtain additional financing or signal recovery to stakeholders, which suggests a negative relationship between analyst guidance and market-to-book.
We include three additional variables to control for the value-relevance of earnings, reliance on implicit claims with stakeholders, and litigation risk. Matsumoto (2002) shows that firms with low value-relevance of earnings (i.e., firms whose future cash flows are predicted poorly by current earnings) are less likely to avoid negative earnings surprises, since market reactions are expected to be relatively moderate. We use EARNRET to control for the value-relevance of earnings. It is computed as the decile rank of the R-squared from yearly industry-specific regressions of cumulative excess returns on yearly changes in earnings.
11 Matsumoto (2002) finds that firms depending particularly on implicit claims with stakeholders are more likely to take actions to avoid negative earnings surprises. She argues that avoiding negative surprises at the earnings announcement yields more favorable terms of trade with stakeholders, such as suppliers, clients, and employees. These groups are likely to limit their the compensation variables, we do not include this proxy for the informational environment. However, including the logarithm of the market value does not change any main conclusions. 10 We also estimate our regression with the firm consensus long term EPS growth forecast supplied by I/B/E/S instead of MB. Our results are insensitive to this modification.
11 Firms are grouped according to their two-digit SIC code. Every year, for each industry group, we regress cumulated daily excess returns (cumulated from three days after the fiscal year t-1 earnings announcement date to 20 days before fiscal year t earnings announcement) on the change in earnings per share from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t, scaled by the share price at the end of fiscal year t-1. We require each industry group to contain at least 8 firms. The firms with 2 R s in the highest (lowest) 10% of the distribution are assigned a value of 1 (10).
assessment of a company's financial performance to reported earnings, since the financial press focuses its attention primarily on earnings announcements rather than initial analyst forecasts. We use the proxies LABOR, DUR, and R&D, developed by Bowen et al. (1995) Secondly, the effect of outliers is mitigated without discarding this information completely as done in censoring the sample. Moreover, this transformation is consistent with imposing decreasing marginal effects as the variables increase. Intuitively, this postulates that the first $1000 of any compensation component have greater importance than a $1000 variation at high income or ownership levels. The cdf transformation is similar to the log transformation commonly applied to firm size. However, the log transformation is less appropriate for the compensation and ownership variables, since there is a large number of observations with value zero. Furthermore, the use of the cdf transformation is not problematic for this study, since we are mainly interested whether distinct components of executive compensation increase or decrease the probability of expectations management (i.e. we are after the sign of the estimated coefficients), rather than estimating precisely the marginal effect of a $1000 increase in executive remuneration on the probability to manage analysts.
[Insert Table 4 here]
In The signs of the correlation coefficients between DOWN and the firm-specific control variables are consistent with previous research.
Measuring the impact of CEO compensation on expectations management
To test whether executive compensation components are associated with expectations management as postulated in our hypotheses, we first perform a logit regression, modeling the probability that analyst expectations have been managed downward. A potential drawback of the pooled logit specification is unobserved heterogeneity. For instance, the CEO's ability to guide or manipulate analysts is hard to measure, but might be correlated with other explanatory variables, thus causing biased coefficient estimates. The executive's skill to negotiate his or her compensation components with the compensation committee, for example, is likely to be correlated with the skill to deal with analysts, and will be reflected in the compensation variables. Moreover, differing attitudes toward business ethics or moral standards are just as hard to observe, but undeniably play a role in the CEO's propensity to manage analysts. Therefore we estimate a fixed effects logit model, allowing for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level: 14 This implies the assumption that observations i = 1,...,N are independent, including consecutive observations of the same firm. In order to correct for firm clustering we compute robust standard errors adjusted for clustering.
However, these differ by less than 3 10 , so we do not report them (available upon request).
Since the estimation of the conditional logit model restricts the sample to firms with temporal variation in the endogenous variable, all the firms which are found to manage expectations throughout the entire sample period have to be excluded from the regression as well as the firms for which the DOWN variable is 0 throughout. Moreover, the conditional logit estimator requires at least two years of observations for each firm. Since the exclusion of these "extreme" observations may diminish the significance of explanatory variables due to sample restriction, as opposed to correcting for unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate the random effects probit model, which is an alternative panel specification that takes unobserved heterogeneity into account without losing the firms deleted with the fixed effects logit method.
The model is specified as follows. In addition we perform further sensitivity analyses relating to variable measurement and conditioning the sample on behavioral thresholds. Table 5 displays the results of the pooled logit regression of the analyst guidance measure DOWN on the compensation and ownership variables, controlling for year effects (coefficients on the year dummies are not reported).
Results
CEO compensation and expectations management
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[Insert Table 5 here] Consistent with our first hypothesis salary has a negative influence on the probability of expectations management. With a p-value 0.000 it is highly significant. Consistent with our second hypothesis, the relationship between bonus and analyst guidance is positive. As with 15 The dummy coefficients are always highly significant jointly.
salary, the p-value 0.000 indicates high significance. Consistent with our third hypothesis, long term incentive plans increase the probability of expectations management. Again, with a p-value 0.000 the variable is highly significant. Not supporting our fourth hypothesis, the variable RSG (restricted stock grants) is not significantly different from zero and has a negative sign. We attribute this result to the failure of the variable (in the raw form) to measure the value of stock at the disposal of the executive for short term transactions.
However, the fourth hypothesis is strongly supported by the high significance of SHARE (pvalue 0.000) which is positively related to expectations management. SHARE is likely a much better proxy to measure the CEO's incentive from stock ownership than RSG, which measures the value of the restricted stocks awarded in the current year only, during which, for many the vesting period has not yet ended. Consistent with our fifth hypothesis, both option value and sensitivity are positive and (highly) significant with p-values 0.000 and 0.011 respectively.
INMONEX and BONUS display the largest coefficients.
In summary, the pooled regression with year effects strongly supports our hypotheses about the relationship between expectations management and CEO compensation, stock and option ownership. Table 6 shows the results of the pooled logit regression of DOWN on the compensation and ownership variables, controlling for year effects and further firm-specific control variables.
[Insert Table 6 here] Again, with only the exception of restricted stock grants all CEO compensation and ownership variables lend strong support to our five hypotheses. The coefficient of SALARY is negative and highly significant (p-value 0.000). The coefficients of BONUS, SHARE, and INMONEX are positive and highly significant (p-values 0.000), while the coefficients on LTIP and OPTSENS remain positive and significant at conventional levels.
The three threshold variables LOSS, INCEPS, and MEET are all significant, with INCEPS
having a negative coefficient. Consistent with prior research (Matsumoto 2002) , the variable proxying for forecasting uncertainty IFE, is negative and highly significant. In contrast to Matsumoto (2002) EARNRET is not significant. Nor is residual analyst coverage RCOV, which also does not explain analyst guidance. In sharp contrast to previous research MB is negative and highly significant. Likely, as conjectured by Brown (2001b) , market-to-book was found positive and significant in explaining analyst management due to growth firms' pronounced stock and option remuneration practices. In our sample we control for these effects and find MB to have the opposite sign, possibly because it proxies for distress. Again, consistent with prior research there is a positive relation between reliance on implicit claims (ICLAIM) and analyst guidance. As in Matsumoto (2002) , LIT is negative, but not significant at conventional levels.
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Overall, the inclusion of additional firm-specific control variables corroborates the importance of executive compensation with stock and option ownership for explaining expectations management.
Sensitivity tests
The results of modeling the dependence across units in a panel framework are presented in Table 7 . The fixed effects logit regression of DOWN on the compensation, ownership, and control variables is displayed in Panel A.
[Insert Table 7 here]
All compensation and ownership components keep their predicted sign, but compared to the pooled logit regression, the marginal effects of the variables BONUS, INMONEX, and
OPTSENS are now about twice as large and still highly significant. No longer significant however, are the compensation and ownership variables SALARY, LTIP, and SHARE. The coefficients of the threshold variables LOSS, INCEPS, and MEET stay at about the same level, but with LOSS being no more significant. Like BONUS and the option variables, the marginal effect of MB is changing remarkably, now being almost four times as large as before and still highly significant and negative. LIT becomes significant, but in opposition to the prediction, whereas ICLAIM loses significance. IFE is still negative and highly significant, EARNRET and RCOV remain insignificant. 16 We also investigate the relationship between expectations management and earnings management. We estimate discretionary accruals as the difference between actual accruals reported by the firms and an estimate of total accruals given by the modified Jones model (Jones 1991) described in Dechow et al. (1995) . In order to control for earnings management, we run regression (6) with an additional dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 when the estimate of discretionary accruals is positive and zero otherwise. This variable is not
The strong changes in the magnitudes of BONUS, INMONEX, and OPTSENS are possibly a sign of unobserved heterogeneity at the firm or equivalently CEO level, relating to skill and ethical standards. However, the conditional logit approach is flawed with the deletion of all firms with the endogenous variable indicating expectations management in all years as well as the firms without expectations management in all years. This way 943 "extreme" observations (12.1% of the sample) are ignored.
Compared to the fixed effect logit regression, the random effect probit approach has the advantage that it does not discard any firms without time series variation in DOWN, but it imposes the restriction that the unit specific effects i D be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. The results are displayed in Table 7 , Panel B. All the variables that were significant in the pooled logit regression remain significant with the same signs as in the random effects probit regression. Again with the exception of RSG, the coefficients of all compensation and ownership variables support our hypotheses relating expectations management to executive compensation. SALARY, BONUS, SHARE, and INMONEX are highly significant (with pvalues 0.000) and LTIP is significant at the conventional level.
In a related robustness test, we check whether there is a bias in the standard errors obtained from the pooled logit regressions due to correlated regression residuals across years.
We run separate yearly cross-sectional regressions for equation (6) and compute the timeseries average coefficients and t-statistics in the style of Fama and McBeth (1973) .
[Insert Table 8 here] Table 8 shows that our main results are robust to this estimation methodology as well.
The significance levels of SALARY and SHARE are reduced, but INMONEX and BONUS remain highly significant, pinpointing the importance of CEO compensation components for causing analyst guidance. However, OPTSENS is no more significant at conventional levels, confirming that the sensitivity of recently granted (and not necessarily exercisable) options has less impact on expectations management practices. The most important differences with respect to the pooled regression results concern the control variables: ICLAIM which was statistically significant and its inclusion does not impact the signs or the statistical significance of the coefficients associated with the other variables. Detailed results are available upon request.
previously highly significant is no more significant, LOSS is no more significant, and INCEPS is only weakly significant. MB and IFE remain highly significant.
To summarize, we find that pooling observations, estimating panel models, and performing Fama-MacBeth regressions altogether lend strong support to our hypotheses. Our major conclusions are not sensitive to the method applied.
We take the pooled logit specification to a final sensitivity analysis conditioning on the behavioral thresholds rather than including them directly in the regressions. This appears appropriate if the incentives produced by executive compensation components to manage analysts depend on reaching the earnings thresholds positive profits (LOSS = 0), positive change in earnings (INCEPS = 1), and reaching the consensus forecast (MEET = 1). The results of conditioning the logit regression on these thresholds are displayed in Table 9 .
[Insert Table 9 here]
The evidence is consistent with the view that reaching earnings thresholds is important for Again we interpret these results as strong support for our hypotheses, with the compensation in stock options providing a particularly strong incentive to manage analysts in all the scenarios under test. The result that SALARY, BONUS, and SHARE while being (strongly) significant in the unconditional regressions, are not significant when earnings thresholds have not been reached, can be reconciled with the fact that thresholds have been reached by far more often than missed in our sample.
CEO compensation and earnings surprises
With the results in the previous subsections we have demonstrated the strong role of CEO remuneration in explaining analysts (downward) guidance. A related question is whether the same compensation and ownership variables also predict the sign of realized earnings surprises, measured by MEET. We expect the same signs for the coefficients of the compensation and ownership variables as in explaining downward guidance.
[Insert Table 10 here] We infer that bonus, in-the-money exercisable options, and SALARY have an equally important role in explaining the sign of earnings surprises as they have in downward guidance of analyst forecasts.
Does the market detect discernible expectations management?
We conduct an event study to investigate whether the market takes into account any discernible expectations management strategies. This requires the calculation of the cumulative abnormal returns around the earnings announcement date. We estimate the following equation: 
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The earnings announcement date is taken from I/B/E/S, individual stock returns are obtained from CRSP, and the market index is the CRSP value-weighted stock index. Equation (9) is estimated with a weighted least square regression as in Heinkel and Kraus (1988) 18 to correct for missing returns. Announcement date returns are missing for 24 observations. As a result, we estimate the model for 7'763 firm-year observations. Table 11 summarizes the cumulative abnormal returns earned by firms at the announcement dates. Consistent with previous research, firms that meet or beat analyst expectations (zero or positive earnings surprise) earn a significant positive abnormal return of 1.30% during the period surrounding the announcement date. On the other hand, firms that fail to meet analyst expectations display a cumulative abnormal return of -1.20% during that period. The return differential between firms that meet or beat expectations and those that fail to do so equals 2.40% and is highly significant.
[Insert Table 11 here]
In Table 12 , we present cumulative abnormal returns conditional on whether a particular company meets or beats analyst expectations and conditional on whether expectations management can be suspected according to our method.
[Insert Table 12 here]
The cumulative abnormal returns earned by firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts by managing analyst expectations downward are 1.10% lower than the cumulative abnormal returns of firms reporting a zero or positive surprise without managing expectations downward. On average, managers who engage in analyst manipulation still earn a positive abnormal return, but this abnormal return amounts to only 0.90% over the period surrounding the announcement date. This suggests that the market has some ability to anticipate the expectations management strategies implemented by managers. For firms that do not meet analyst expectations, no significant difference is observed in cumulative abnormal returns conditional on whether expectations management is suspected.
The objective of the following analysis is to investigate whether the lower abnormal returns reported for firms suspected of managing analyst expectations downward depends on CEO compensation components and on firm-specific variables which have been shown to impact analyst guidance. In other words, we aim to assess which variables are taken into account by investors to detect potential analyst manipulation strategies. In order to do so, we model the cumulative abnormal returns of firms that meet or beat analyst expectations as a function of a subset of our explanatory variables. This subset contains the explanatory variables that are either partially or fully known by the market at the earnings announcement dates. We estimate the following model.
with all variables defined as before. 19 We expect the variables which were shown to be positively related to expectations management, to be negatively related with cumulative abnormal returns at the announcement dates. More precisely, the sign of the coefficients associated with SHR, INMONEX, ICLAIM and LIT are expected to be negative. If the abnormal returns of growth firms are entirely generated by their CEOs' stock and option positions, MB should not be significant, whereas, regarding our previous regression results, we could expect as well a positive coefficient. whose CEOs hold relatively large positions of in-the-money exercisable options. Contrary to expectation, the coefficient associated with firms with high litigation risk is positive and significant. However, as documented above, our regression results concerning this coefficient are difficult to reconcile as LIT does not seem to be positively associated with expectations management. Regarding the low adjusted 2 R , there might be other variables that can explain the documented lower abnormal return at the announcement date for firms that manage analyst expectations downward. We leave this issue for further research.
[Insert Table 13 here]
In summary, we show that the gains for CEOs from managing earnings expectations downward also comes at a cost for executives. The abnormal return for firms that manage to meet or beat analyst forecasts by manipulating expectations downward is significantly lower than the abnormal return for firms that fulfill market estimates without manipulating analyst expectations. Our results indicate that the reduced abnormal return for companies suspected of managing analysts is positively related to the value of in-the-money exercisable options owned by CEOs.
Conclusion
This paper investigates whether the increasing tendency of executives to manage analyst forecasts downward is, as informally suggested by past academic research and financial media, related to a change in the structure of executive compensation packages. Using CEO compensation components in conjunction with their share and option ownership, our results are consistent with this explanation. We show that CEOs who hold considerable share and option positions are more likely to manage analyst expectations downward. Moreover, other compensation components that are not directly related to share price movements are shown to have a significant impact on CEOs' analyst guidance motives. Expectations management is negatively related to salary, indicating that high fixed compensation decreases the incentives of managers to manipulate analyst forecasts. Furthermore, we document a positive relationship between the annual bonus paid to CEOs and expectations management. This suggests that board of directors' expectations are related to analyst expectations and that meeting analyst expectations may be an important criterion used by boards of directors to measure CEO performance.
In a second set of investigations, we show that the cumulative abnormal return for firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts at the announcement date is significantly lower for firms that are likely to pursue expectations management strategies. We show that this lower return is significantly related to the amount of options held by CEOs. This suggests that the market has some ability to identify firms that manage analysts in order to meet or beat their forecasts more easily.
Using a large U.S. sample, we document for the first time the importance and impact of CEO compensation components on expectations management. However, our results may not generalize to all market segments, since the substantial amount of data needed to conduct this study requires a sample with relatively large firms. Moreover, since executive compensation components are only available from the main provider on an annual basis, we conduct our study with annual earnings per share forecasts. As a result, our results may not be generalized to quarterly earnings forecasts.
Promising directions for further research include extending the set of executives beyond the CEO to study compensation and ownership effects on expectations management, devising trading strategies based on executive compensation information and earnings "surprises", as well as modeling temporal trends more explicitly in order to examine whether the documented temporal patterns in analyst guidance and earnings surprises can be entirely explained by the strong growth in stock price sensitive components of executive compensation.
Measuring the sensitivity of the CEO's stock option award to a 1% price change of the underlying company's stock price
The value of the options awarded yearly to CEOs can be calculated with the following formula:
where The incentive sensitivity from awarded options (OPTSENS) in a given year is estimated in the following way:
where
We use the following assumptions to estimate the parameters of the Black-Scholes formula: Returns on earnings EARNRET is the decile rank from industry specific regressions of cumulative excess returns on yearly changes in earnings. LOSS is an indicator variable which equals one if a loss is reported in the current fiscal year. MEET is an indicator variable which equals one if reported earnings meet or beat the last consensus estimate prior to the announcement. Increasing earnings per share INCEPS is an indicator variable that equals one if reported earnings per share exceed the previous year's earnings per share. Initial forecast error IFE is the absolute value of the difference between the first consensus estimate in the fiscal year and reported earnings per share, scaled by share price at the beginning of the fiscal year. Residual analyst coverage RCOV is the residual from a regression of the log of one plus the number of analysts contributing to the last consensus estimate prior to the announcement on the log market value of the company at the beginning of the fiscal year. Market-to-book ratio MB is market value of equity divided by book value of assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. Labor intensity LABOR is defined as one minus the ratio of gross property, plant, and equipment to total gross assets. DUR is a dummy variable indicating membership in durable goods industries 245, (250) (251) (252) (253) (254) (255) (256) (257) (258) (259) 283, 301, . R&D is annual research expenses divided by total assets. Missing values for R&D are set to zero. ICLAIM is the score of the factor analysis combining LABOR, DUR, and R&D into a single variable measuring reliance on implicit claims. LIT is a dummy variable indicating membership in litigious industries (SIC codes 2833 (SIC codes -2836 . The total number of observations is 7'787. Table 4 Correlation coefficients for regression variables Table 3 . The total number of observations is 7'787. Bold figures denote significance at the 1% level. Figures in italic denote significance at the 5% level. Table 5 The relation between downward guidance and CEO compensation components Pooled logit regression estimates of DOWN on all explanatory variables; year effects are included but not reported. All exogenous variables are defined in Table 2 and Table 3 .
SALARY, BONUS, LTIP, RSG, SHARE, INMONEX, OPTSENS, IFE
, and MB are expressed in terms of the values assigned by their cumulative distribution functions. All reported items are defined as in Table 5 . Conditional logit (fixed effects) and random effects probit estimates of DOWN on all explanatory variables; year effects are included but not reported. All exogenous variables are defined in Table 2 and Table 3 . SALARY, BONUS, LTIP, RSG, SHARE, INMONEX, OPTSENS, IFE, and MB are expressed in terms of the values assigned by their cumulative distribution functions. All reported items are defined as in Table 5 . Average coefficients of yearly logit regressions for equation (6). In the third column, pvalues corresponding to the reported t-statistics are displayed. t-statistics are computed as the mean coefficient divided by its standard deviation multiplied by the square-root of the number of cross sections. In column 4, the number of yearly regressions is reported, for which the sign of the coefficient is as expected. For the variables for which no sign prediction can be made, column 4 reports the number of years, in which the sign of the coefficient corresponds to the sign obtained for the average coefficient value. All exogenous variables are defined in Table 2 and Table 3 Pooled logit estimates of DOWN on all explanatory variables except for the three threshold variables on which the regressions are conditioned; year effects are included but not reported.
All exogenous variables are defined in Table 2 and Table 3 . SALARY, BONUS, LTIP, RSG, SHARE, INMONEX, OPTSENS, IFE, and MB are expressed in terms of the values assigned by their cumulative distribution functions. All reported items are defined as in Table 5 . Pooled logit estimates of DOWN on all explanatory variables except for the three threshold variables on which the regressions are conditioned; year effects are included but not reported.
All exogenous variables are defined in Table 2 and Table 3 . SALARY, BONUS, LTIP, RSG, SHARE, INMONEX, OPTSENS, IFE, and MB are expressed in terms of the values assigned by their cumulative distribution functions. All reported items are defined as in Table 5 . Pooled logit regression results of MEET on all explanatory variables; year effects are included but not reported. All exogenous variables are defined in Table 2 and Table 3 . SALARY, BONUS, LTIP, RSG, SHARE, INMONEX, OPTSENS, IFE, and MB are expressed in terms of the values assigned by their cumulative distribution functions. All reported items are defined as in Table 5 . Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for 7'763 firm-year observations around the earnings announcement dates between 1993 and 2000. CARs are estimated with a market model type regression over 250 days ending two days after the event date, using a WLS regression as in Heinkel and Krauss (1998) . The event window ranges from two days preceding the earnings announcement date to two days after this date. Companies' cumulative abnormal returns are classified into two distinct categories according to the sign of their earnings surprise. The earnings surprise is computed as the difference between the released earnings per share and the last consensus issued by analysts for a particular firm in a given year. Heinkel and Krauss (1998) . The event window ranges from two days preceding the earnings announcement date to two days after this date. Companies' cumulative abnormal returns are classified into four distinct categories according to the sign of their earnings surprise and the sign of their unexpected forecast error (UEF). Earnings surprise is computed as the difference between the released earnings per share and the last consensus issued by analysts for a particular firm in a given year. A given company is suspected of managing expectations in a given year if 0 UEF . UEF is computed as described in section 4. Regression results of the cumulative abnormal returns of firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts on CEO compensation components and firm-specific control variables, which are partially or entirely known by the market at the earnings announcement dates. CARs are estimated with a market model type regression over 250 days ending two days after the event date with a WLS regression as in Heinkel and Krauss (1998) . The event window ranges from two days preceding the earnings announcement date to two days after this date. SHARE, INMONEX, and MB are expressed in terms of the values assigned by their cumulative distribution functions. t-statistics are based on White (1980).
